In this paper we consider the modern theory of the Bayesian brain from cognitive neurosciences in the light of recommender systems and expose potentials for our community. In particular, we elaborate on noisy user feedback and the thus resulting multicomponent user models, which have indeed a biological origin. In real user experiments we observe the impact of both factors directly in a repeated rating task along with recommendation. As a consequence, this contribution supports the plausibility of contemporary theories of mind in the context of recommender systems and can be understood as a solicitation to integrate ideas of cognitive neurosciences into our systems in order to further improve the prediction of human behaviour.
INTRODUCTION
In our community of recommender systems, there are continual e orts to make predictions more precise and systems more e cient and user-friendly. In doing so, the classic approach is to model the relationship between a user and items in terms of optimising a target function in order to predict future user decisions based on training data. However, there are two major problems that are caused by human nature. First of all, many studies prove that users are not entirely certain about a decision so that a given rating may uctuate when the rating task is repeated (noisy user feedback) [1, 2, 8, 10] . Second, optimising a target function might not su ciently account for dynamic changes in behaviour (need for multicomponent user models) which again can be proven in systematic user experiments [13] . e theories of cognitive neurosciences know these phenomena and describe these aspects of human cognition by means of probabilistic models. For example, the origin of volatile decisionmaking and noisy user feedback is due to the irregular transmission of informations through the synaptic cle . A Bayesian formulation of this e ect leads directly to multicomponent models as an explicit consequence of user noise. Both of these factors, noisy user feedback and multicomponent models, have recently been proven Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for pro t or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the rst page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the owner/author(s). arXiv, Kevin Jasberg and Sergej Sizov to have a signi cant impact on prediction quality in recommender systems [1, 9, 12] . erefore, this contributions seeks the bene ts of implementing neuroscienti c models and will give experimental indication for possible de ciencies within the eld of recommender research in case of omission.
THEORY AND EXPERIMENTS
e Bayesian brain theory is a composition of Bayesian inference and theoretical neurology. We will rst demonstrate similarity to Bayesian recommender systems and then discuss the modelling of noisy data as well as multicomponent user models.
Bayesian Learning Basics
From the perspective of cognitive neuroscience, it all starts with the brain observing sensory input Y (visual, auditory, etc.) and making an estimate of the state of the world X [3] . To continiously improve this estimation -or subjective beliefs to be more precisely -the brain has to learn by comparing reality against predictions based on these beliefs [5] . is makes the human brain a highly sophisticated recommender system itself. e Bayes eorem provides the basis for the processing of beliefs along with real world evidence.
ose con rmed or modi ed beliefs are thereby brought to ever new situations. Mathematically spoken, the posterior serves as prior in subsequent cognitions. For multiple independent sensory observations = ( 1 , . . . , n ) we yield
where
is the posterior of X given sensory data until time t − 1 and serves as prior for time t (learning from the past). When the world state itself changes while making observations, we need to consider a transition probabilities P(X t |X t −1 )
which is the basis of learning by iteration. Here, we can already see the similarity to Bayesian recommender systems clearly [11] . But how does the brain actually model prior probabilities? Mathematically, this question is pointless when hierarchical networks are used since these models optimise the priors themselves through mutual back-propagation of predictions and forward-feeding of prediction errors [5] as to see in Figure 1 . e optimisation task itself is done by neuron clusters (agents) via minimising the so called free energy [5] . In consequence, beliefs do exist in the form of probability densities, from which particular draws are made for decision making. We will see later that these distributions indeed exist in the case of product ratings.
Neural Noise and Decision-Making
Message passing works by relaying electrical signals from one neuron to the next through the synaptic gap by means of neurotransmi ers. However, same signals never result into emi ing the same amount of transmi ers (neural noise) [4] [5] [6] 15] . is noise may raise too weak (or su cient) signals above (or below) a certain threshold, causing a neuron to inhibit (or to re) [3] . In fact, for the ring of a neuron, we can only specify a probability [3, 7] . In a recommender's language, biological irregularity implies that every time a decision-making is repeated, other prior probabilities might be used and thus the resulting belief is never quite the same as before. In a systematic experiment, real users repeatedly rated theatrical trailers on a 5-star scale. It turns out that only 35% of all users show constant rating behaviour, whereas about 50% use two di erent answer categories and 15% of all users make use of three or more categories. Figure 2 is a characteristic example for these results. is sows that individuals are not able to perfectly reproduce their decision-making. ese uctuations can be explained by the theory of neural noise, and have a direct e ect on recommender systems. Assuming the model based prediction to be π = 3, a user rating r = 4 can not be seen as a deviation according to Figure  2 . Furthermore, by gathering information about temporary belief posteriors [14] , it can be proven that all user responses (aggregated for each item) hold the same expectation.
is is an indication for a common source of noise with constant magnitude, i.e. the manifestation of neural noise.
Modelling User Preferences
When it comes to a repeated product rating where the participant does not remember his previous response, as induced in our controlled experiment, the process of decision making is restarted. Accordingly, the participant receives a new and slightly di erent belief distribution for each rating trial. is has been mathematically explained in [6] and implies the need for multicomponent user models, which have recently been adressed in recommender systems research [9, 13] . Figure 3 shows the RMSEs of three di erent systems utilised in our experiment, based on one-component models along with the scores each system has achieved in each trial. It is apparent that some draws (scores) can not be drawn from the corresponding distribution. is indicates that users had changed their rating behaviour and sampled from di erent distributions for di erent trials. It can be proven via hypothesis testing that rating behaviour of trial 1 and 5 signi cantly deviates from trials 2 to 4. is can be explained by memory e ects: In trial 1, decision-making was initialised for the rst time. A er the trial 2, participants got aware that the experiment was about repetition and so started to remember their ratings. erefore, belief distributions remained more or less the same. A er the trial 4 plus constant addition of new distractors, short-time memory was not able to keep all previous information and further decision-making produced di erent belief distributions again. ese ndings within simple recommendation scenarios can be entirely described by the Bayesian brain theory and may help systems to learn human behaviour more naturally.
CONCLUSION
We have shown that the Bayesian brain theory uses the same models as Bayesian recommender systems. In addition, we have shown that the Bayesian brain theory is already in a position to model quantities whose impact can be seen in recommendation scenarios. We have demonstrated this by the example of noisy user feedback and multicomponent models. e impact of these factors has been discussed brie y, i.e. the interpretation of correct and false predictions has to be considered more di erentiated whereas the choice of user models holds a strong dependency on time. We therefore recommend to adopt corresponding models from neurosciences in order to optimise recommender systems in terms of imitating human behaviour.
